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Abstract
Motivated by the disconnect between survey evidence documenting that executives prior-
itize implicit contracting (i.e., labor market based career concerns) when making earnings
management decisions (Graham et al (2005)) and the extant literature's focus on explicit
contracting to explain earnings manipulation, we examine analytically the role of manage-
rial career concerns in earnings management. Building on Holmstrom (1982, 1999), we
present a career concerns based earnings management model that incorporates the unique
reversing nature of earnings management. A key insight derived from the model is that
whether the predictions of a traditional career concerns model prevail, which is to say
that managers engage in more income-increasing behavior in their early years, critically
depends upon the reversal characteristics of the earnings management vehicle chosen.
JEL Classication: M40, M41.
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1 Introduction
Top executives of US publicly-traded rms often face intense incentives to manage earn-
ings.1 Broadly speaking, executives can manage reported earnings in one of two ways. First,
managers may use \accruals management", which refers to the discretion available within
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) to \ `obscure' or `mask' true economic
performance" (Dechow and Skinner (2000)). Alternatively, executives may use real activities
manipulation to alter the timing and amount of expenditures in order to aect the current
period's bottom line (e.g., cutting R&D expenditures).2 Most of the extant academic liter-
ature links the incentives for both real and accruals based earnings management, directly or
indirectly, to explicit contracts.3 While explicit contracting-based incentives undoubtedly play
an important role, the literature has been almost silent about the eects of implicit contracts
and implicit incentives over earnings management4 even though a recent survey by Graham,
Harvey and Rajgopal (2005) documents that more than three quarters of responding execu-
tives consider upward mobility in the labor market (i.e., an implicit career incentive) to be
more important than short-run current compensation benets in inuencing their earnings
management decisions.5 Our study addresses the apparent disconnect between this survey
evidence regarding the importance of implicit contracts and the extant literature's focus on
explicit contracting explanations, by presenting a model of earnings management that builds
upon the seminal career concerns work of Holmstrom (1982, 1999). Specically, we incorpo-
1For an excellent and extensive academic summary of the earnings management literature, we refer the
reader to Ronen and Yaari (2008). Prominent examples of non-academic sources of attention to the issue of
earnings management pressures include the famous speeches by Levitt (1998, 2003).
2Unlike accruals earnings management, real activities earnings manipulations have direct cash ow conse-
quences to the rm. Real activities management involves deviations from optimal business practices, such as
cutting discretionary expenses (e.g., R&D or advertising) or incurring abnormal production costs, with the
primary objective of upwardly manipulating the current period's reported earnings.
3Contracting-based motives for earnings management that have been examined include executive current
cash bonus maximization (Healy 1985), the avoidance of debt covenant violations (Defond and Jiambalvo
1994), more favorable equity and bond pricing (Teoh, Welch and Wong 1998a and 1998b; Aharony, Wang
and Yuan 2010; Higgins 2013), the reduction of debt renegotiation costs (Bohren and Haug 2006), political
cost considerations (Key 1997; Patten and Trompeter 2003), and executive equity compensation (Cheng and
Wareld 2005).
4One exception is the study by Bowen, DuCharme and Shores (1995). These authors consider the impact
of various stakeholders' implicit claims, notably excluding managerial career concerns, on accounting method
choices (i.e., not accruals or real activities management perse).
5Furthermore, Gillan et al (2009) document that fewer than half of the CEOs of S&P 500 rms have
comprehensive explicit employment agreements.
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rate features of the accrual accounting performance measurement system and the longer-term
value-destroying eects of real activities earnings management. While the traditional predic-
tion of career concerns models is that managers will exert themselves more in their early years
in order to inuence the labor market's assessment of their quality, the major implication of
our model is that the extent to which managers engage income-increasing earnings manage-
ment when they are young relative to old depends critically on the rate at which earnings
management reverses.
Our paper contributes to the literature by analytically demonstrating the role of career
concerns in determining earnings management levels. Moreover, the model's predictions do
not extrapolate from a traditional Holmstrom model, but rather they depend critically upon
the reversing nature of alternative earnings management channels.
2 Model
2.1 Model Setup and Assumptions
We develop a model of earnings management based upon managerial career concerns by build-
ing on the seminal work of Holmstrom (1982, 1999). As interpreted by Autrey, Dikolli and
Newman (2007),\Career concerns are implicit incentives that arise because a manager ex-
pects future wages to be aected by the labor market's use of publicly-observable performance
measures to assess the manager's ability." It is worth noting that a distinctive characteristic
of career concerns models is that managers are incentivized by future, rather than current,
compensation.
To illustrate the eects of career concerns, we adopt a simple three-period setting in which
the manager is young, established, and then retired in each respective period. In periods 1 and
2, the executive is responsible for managing the rm, while in period 3 the manager may serve
as a board member during retirement. Consistent with competitive labor markets being a key
premise underlying the general career concerns framework, we also assume that the manager is
paid, at the beginning of each period, the expected output that she will deliver in the current
period given her history of outputs.
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Let  denote the manager's unobservable productivity. For simplicity, assume that 
remains constant over time, with the following prior distribution
  N (m0; 1=h0) (1)
where N (  ;  ) is the standard normal distribution function, m0 is the mean for the prior, and
h0 is the precision of the prior (i.e., the inverse of its variance).
Let xt denote the reported output in period t such that x1 and x2 are the earnings reported
by the manager when she is young and established respectively, while x3 is the value added
from the manager's post-retirement board service. During periods t = 1; 2 the manager may
manipulate accruals or engage in real activities to manage earnings. The period 1 reported
earnings are therefore given by
x1 =  + 1 + 1; (2)
where 1 is the earnings management through accruals manipulation or real activities in period
1. 1 is the shock, which is uncorrelated with the manager's productivity . Shocks in each
period are assumed to be normally distributed with precision h, such that
t  N (0; 1=h): (3)
We assume that , 1, 2 and 3 are jointly independent.
In period 1, when the manager is young, she can \impress" the labor market in the short
term by boosting earnings via accruals manipulation or real activity choices. However, the
amount of accruals manipulation in period 1 must be partially or fully reversed in period
2. This assumption states that earnings cannot be indenitely managed upward via accruals
without triggering a forced earnings restatement or fraud investigation, both of which are
assumed to be associated with extreme penalties to the manager. In other words, the manager
needs to balance the books via accruals reversals \eventually," although some portion of the
reversal may occur in period 3, after the manager has retired. Accruals management decisions
are assumed to be value-neutral in that they only involve using the discretion allowed within
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GAAP to aect reported earnings, they do not impact real activities and thus real value
creation.
By contrast, real activity earnings management involves managers taking actions to adjust
the timing and/or scale of the rm's underlying business activities away from their optimal
level. Alternatively stated, these activities are value-destroying. The real activities earnings
management in period 1 is therefore penalized (i.e., it reverses back) at a multiple rate in
period 2. This assumption that accruals reversal is at most dollar-for-dollar while the reversal
of real activities is more than dollar-for-dollar will be shown to have important implications
for the predictions of the model.
In period 2, when the manager is at the established stage of her career, the period 1 earnings
manipulations (accruals or real activities) begin to reverse and the manager has the option
to engage in a second round of earnings manipulations. Let 2 denote the amount of \new"
earnings manipulation in period 2. Reported output in period 2 is given by
x2 =  + 2   1 + 2; (4)
where   1 if the channel of earnings management is accruals based, and  > 1 if earnings
management is accomplished via real activities.
The second period's earnings manipulations also reverse in the subsequent period, after
the manager is retired. Because the period 2 manipulations will reverse only when the rm
is under new management, however, the retired manager will bear no \direct" consequences
from her period 2 earnings manipulation since the market will not incorporate the third period
earnings reversal when inferring the manager's productivity (i.e., her type). Therefore, the
only mitigating force for the manager not to engage in excess manipulation in period 2 is
the convex cost of manipulating earnings.6 Let c() denote the cost associated with earnings
manipulation, with the standard properties of c0() > 0, c00() > 0, and c0(0) = 0.
6Consistent with the notion that there are costs associated with earnings management that are borne by
executives, Hazarika et al (2012) provide empirical evidence that CEOs who manage earnings have a greater
likelihood of experiencing a forced turnover. See also Liang (2004), who discusses the executive's costs of
earnings management at greater length.
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Lastly, the retirement period 3 output, x3, is given by
x3 =  + 3; (5)
Let wt denote the executive's wage in period t, paid at the beginning of period t. The as-
sumptions of competitive labor markets and no explicit performance-based pay lead to the
following:
w1 = E(x1jprior); (6)
w2(x1) = E(x2jx1); (7)
w3(x1; x2) = E(x3jx1; x2): (8)
2.2 The Derivation of Optimal Earnings Management Levels
The executive's objective is to maximize her utility function, which is represented as the
discounted present value of her lifetime compensation, net of the cost of earnings management:
U = E

w1   c(1) + (w2   c(2)) + 2w3

; (9)
where 0 <  < 1 is the executive's subjective discount factor.
Substituting (5) into (8) yields:
w3(x1; x2) = E(jx1; x2) (10)
Let 1 and 2 denote the labor market's conjectures of 1 and 2, respectively. z1 and z2
represent the market's conjectures of unmanaged earnings, dened as:
z1  x1   1 =  + 1 (11)
z2  x2   2 + 1 =  + 2: (12)
We apply the standard belief updating formula to obtain the conditional distribution of 
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given z1 and z2 as follows:
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Thus, the market begins with prior m0, and adjusts its beliefs about  based upon the
information conveyed by z1 and z2. Similar to Holmstrom (1982, 1999) and other career
concerns models, both the market and the manager are equally informed about managerial
ability in all periods, all participants learn about the manager's type in the same way, and
there is no information asymmetry.8 The manager does try to inuence the market's inference
about her type, and consequently a moral hazard issue will arise, however in equilibrium no
one is fooled. Thus, the market correctly anticipates the level of earnings management in
equilibrium, and z1 and z2 are known in equilibrium given the observed outputs in periods 1
and 2, x1 and x2, respectively.
The wages are given by:
w3(x1; x2) = E(jx1; x2) = m0 + h
h0 + 2h
(x1 + x2   2 + (  1)1   2m0) (14)
w2(x1) = E(jx1) + 2   1 =
h0m0 + h(x1   1)
h0 + h
+ 2   1 (15)
w1 = E(x1jprior) = E(jprior) + 1 = m0 + 1 (16)




(z1  m0) into equation (15). We also rely on the assumption that all players (i.e.,
the manager and the market) are able to determine the optimal 2 by solving the backward
induction problem in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. This implies the following rst order
conditions for period 2, where the manager chooses 2 to maximize Ef c(2) + w3g using
(14):
 c0(2) +  h
h0 + 2h
= 0; (17)
7See, e.g., Greene (1997) Theorem 3.6 on marginal and conditional normal distributions.
8In other words, neither our model nor the standard careers concerns setup are adverse selection models.
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The rst order derivative with respect to 1 is:
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The rst order conditions in (18) and (20) guarantee a maximum value for the objective
function given that the second-order conditions are satised.
2.3 Interpretation of Optimal Earnings Management Levels
We now discuss and interpret the optimal levels of earnings management in periods one and
two, i.e., 1 and 2 for the cases of accruals and real activities earnings management each in
turn.
Case 1 - Accruals:   1
The case of   1 implies a partial or full reversal of period 1 earnings management ac-
tivities in period 2, and is thus applicable to accruals channeled earnings management. If
  1 , then from (18) and (20), we have: c0(1) > c0(2), which immediately translates to
1 > 2. This scenario therefore results in predictions that are similar to those of the classical
Holmstrom career concerns model, with managers exerting more eort when they are young
in order to improve the labor market's perceptions of their abilities.
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Case 2 - Real Activities:  > 1
The numerous cases discussed below, each with  > 1 and thus implying more than full re-
versal of period 1 earnings management activity in period 2, are applicable to value-destroying
real activities earnings management.
Sub-case 2.1: 1 <  < 1 + 1
h
h0+h
Under this scenario, c0(1) > c0(2) and thus 1 > 2 still holds. As a consequence,
the model suggests that, provided the real activity earnings management is not very value-
destroying, younger managers' desire to impress the labor market early on will dominate the
(discounted) negative impact of the amplied reversal in the second period. that is, the re-
versing nature of the rst period activities is not sucient to overturn the standard career
concerns result of higher early period eort.
Sub-case 2.2: 1 <  = 1 + 1
h
h0+h
Under this scenario, c0(1) = c0(2), implying 1 = 2. Thus, when the value destroying eect
of a particular real earnings management reaches a specic level, a younger manager exerts
neither more nor less earnings management eort in her earlier career relative to her later
years. This is the tipping point at which the benets of managing earnings more when the
manager is young are exactly oset by the (discounted) negative impact of reversal when she
is old.
Sub-case 2.3: 1 + 1
h
h0+h
<  < 1 + 1
h0+2h
h0+h
Under this scenario, 0 < c0(1) < c0(2), leading to 0 < 1 < 2. In other words, when
real activity earnings management is very value-destroying, the younger manager's desire to
impress the labor market yields to her concerns regarding the anticipated negative reversal
eect in the later years of her career. Thus, the results run contrary to the standard career
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concerns model; managers will engage in less real earnings management activity when they
are young.




In this case, c0(1)  0, leading to the corner solution of 1 = 0. Thus, in the situation where
real activities management is extremely value-destroying, younger managers will refrain from
doing any such activity because even low levels of this kind of earnings management will lead
to a loss of utility.
2.4 Discussion
The key insight from our model is that the extent to which the predictions of the traditional
career concerns model prevail in an earnings management setting (i.e., whether the manager
exerts more eort towards earnings management in their early versus their later years) is
critically dependent upon the rate at which the period 1 earnings management reverses (i.e.,
). Figure 1 provides a graphical depiction of this relation between the equilibrium levels of
earnings management at dierent career stages (i.e. 1 and 2) and the extent to which the
early career stage earnings management reverses prior to the manager's retirement (i.e., ) .
Insert Figure 1 here
As shown, for any  less than  = 1 + 1
h
h0+h
, the traditional career concerns eect
dominates and managers engage in more income-increasing earnings management when they
are young. The opposite prediction holds, however, once  exceeds the tipping point, .
Beyond this point, the manager's concerns over the negative impact of reversal on her future
wage dominates her desire to signal her quality to the labor market in the early years such
that the younger manager will engage in less of this type of earnings management. Once 
reaches 1 + 1
h0+2h
h0+h
, such concerns become so prohibitive that the manager does not engage
in any such real activities earnings management early on.
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We make a few additional observations regarding the model. First, while the optimal
amount of earnings management in period 1, 1, is monotonically decreasing with , the
optimal amount of earnings management in period 2, 2, is a constant that is independent of
.9




related to both  (the discount factor) and the ratio of the precision of prior information
to the precision of new information (h0h ). Intuitively, a larger  implies that damage on
future wages that arises from reversal are discounted less (i.e., the costs of future reversals are
weighted more heavily) and therefore it takes a lower value of  to ip the equilibrium from a
traditional career concerns result with higher earlier career eorts to one where the concerns
over the negative impact of reversals dominates such that there is lower early stage earnings
management. Furthermore, greater values of h0 relative to h, imply that priors are relatively
more informative than new information, and thus new information does not weigh heavily in
the market's assessments of the manager's quality. Accordingly, when the market has more
(less) precise prior information and less (more) precise new information, there is less (more)
propensity for the manager to engage in earnings management activities in order to inuence
the labor market's perceptions and thus a smaller (bigger) value of  is needed to reach the
tipping point.
Lastly, because the manager's wages are assumed to be determined at the beginning of
each period based upon expected output, the model eectively assumes away the role of ex-
plicit compensation contracts. The latter entail compensation being paid at the end of the
period based upon realized output. Accordingly, all of the model's predictions derive solely
from managers' career concerns, which are characterized by implicit incentives and implicit
contracts.














We analytically investigate the impact of managers' career concerns on their earnings man-
agement decisions. Largely building upon the classic work of Holmstrom (1982, 1999), we
incorporate the unique reversing feature of earnings management and generate important pre-
dictions. The key message conveyed is that not all earnings managements are created equal.
Settings where the magnitude of a particular earnings management reversal is smaller yield
outcomes that are similar to traditional career concerns results (i.e., more eort will be ex-
pended toward this activity in the early years). By contrast, settings in which a particular
real activity earnings management is very value destructive lead to the opposite outcome of
lower levels of early career stage earnings management. Our ndings are novel to the literature
and help to bridge the disconnect between survey evidence that documents that executives
prioritize implicit contracting (i.e., labor market based career concerns) when making earn-
ings management decisions (Graham et al (2005)) and the extant literature's focus on explicit
contracting as an explanation for earnings manipulation.
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Figure 1: The earnings management levels at equilibrium (α ) versus the magnitude of earnings 
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